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6The 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict of the twentieth century and a turning point in 
the balance of power in East Asia. In the short term, Russia’s defeat helped precipitate the 1905 Russian Revolution 
and the 1917 October Revolution. More broadly, the aftermath of the war informed Japan’s imperial ambitions in 
Manchuria—the early stages of World War II in Asia during the 1930s—and continuing Russo-Japanese enmity 
over Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Island chain. Studying this historical conflict in terms of international relations 
provides valuable insights into the nature of the conflict and how the past continues to shape modern geopolitics. 
As a case study, the war offers important lessons in the difficulties of sustained power projection and the exigencies 
involved in adaptable war planning. Equally important, Russia and Japan’s intractable imperial ambitions coupled 
with their failures to credibly communicate resolve serve as a cautionary tale on the consequences of inept 
diplomacy.
The Russo-Japanese War
Origins and Implications
Benjamin Mainardi
2019-2020 / Volume 7
James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal 7
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
European great powers carved out spheres of influence in 
East Asia. As available territory became limited, empires 
seeking to expand competed against one another. While 
contemporaries widely regarded Russia as the dominant 
force in East Asia, Japanese power was rapidly growing. 
Both powers preyed on the ailing Qing dynasty of China. 
Russia steadily eroded Chinese territory in the north while 
Japan waged war with China for control of Korea. Sustained 
Russian power projection in the East necessitated access 
to a warm-water port. This was found at Port Arthur on 
the strategic Liaodong Peninsula just north of the Korean 
border. By the late 1890s, Russia and Japan were at odds 
over territorial ambitions in this region. Russian presence 
gradually intensified in Manchuria and began encroaching 
on Korea in spite of Korea’s position within Japan’s sphere 
of influence. 
The resulting contest for 
domination of East Asia would 
become the first major armed 
conflict of the twentieth century.
As this emerging security dilemma began to jeopardize 
Japan’s foothold on the Asian mainland, tensions between 
Russia and Japan escalated. Unable to reach an agreeable 
status quo while neglecting to fully indicate its resolve on 
the issue of Korea, Japan prepared for conflict. In February 
1904, breaching international etiquette established by 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Imperial 
Japanese Navy launched a surprise strike against the Russian 
Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur prior to officially declaring war 
(Aldrich 2000). The resulting contest for domination of East 
Asia would become the first major armed conflict of the 
twentieth century. Examining this archetypal case study in 
regional power transition reveals the perils of intractability 
and sustained power projection.
Historical Background
Understanding the origins of the Russo-Japanese War first 
necessitates an understanding of contemporary East Asian 
geopolitics. For nearly three thousand years, various Chinese 
imperial dynasties had been the regional superpowers of 
East Asia with few peer competitors. Historians largely agree 
that this lack of true peer-competition led to military and 
industrial stagnation in the later Qing dynasty (Naquin 
1987, 219-221). From 1644 to at least 1800, the dynasty 
was the unquestioned hegemon of East Asia. Yet by 1800, 
Western powers began encroaching on Chinese client-states 
and spheres of influence. Portugal had solidified its hold on 
the once Chinese-held port city of Macau, and the Dutch 
fostered an ever-growing presence in Taiwan and much of 
modern Indonesia. Meanwhile, Spain maintained control of 
the Philippine Islands, the British presence in India was slowly 
permeating throughout Southeast Asia, and friction along 
the Chinese northern border with Russia was intensifying 
(Zhao 1998, 26). However, the Chinese-led international 
order of East and Southeast Asia established by the Tributary 
and Guangzhou Systems persisted (Zhao 1998, 25). 
Largely dissatisfied with these regional systems in which 
the Qing dynasty dominated virtually all political and 
economic affairs, European states gradually began to erode 
Chinese influence in the region. As such, the power of East 
Asia’s traditional hegemony was supplanted throughout the 
nineteenth century, rupturing the unipolar order without a 
sufficiently powerful state to replace China. Russia and Great 
Britain, in particular, heavily shaped the regional dynamics 
of East Asia during the late eighteenth century. Frustrated by 
an inability to expand in the Balkans, Crimea, or Southwest 
Asia in the first half of the eighteenth century, Russia began 
to look eastward. It progressively occupied greater portions 
of eastern Siberia and northern Mongolia, creating tensions 
with China (Malozemoff 1958, 19-23). Great Britain desired 
ever-greater trading rights with the Qing dynasty and 
eventually exacted its economic ambitions through a series of 
conflicts known as the Opium Wars. By 1898, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, and Russia all held de facto control over 
large portions of the Chinese mainland (MacNair and Lach 
1950, 53).
At the same time, Japan was emerging from nearly two 
centuries of self-imposed isolation under the recently 
overthrown Tokugawa Shogunate. The new Meiji government 
recognized that nations not poised for offense were likely to 
be dominated by those that were. After observing the gradual 
erosion of Chinese territory by the West and being subjected 
to unequal trade treaties, the Meiji government’s chief priority 
was modernizing Japan’s industry and military. Prior to 
1850, however, Japan’s economy was still primarily based on 
subsistence agriculture; military technological development 
had largely stagnated since the founding of the Tokugawa 
regime in 1603 (Tuan-Hwee and Moriguchi 2014, 464). 
Extraordinarily, the Meiji government was able to modernize 
effectively using Japan’s existing political infrastructure and 
posture as a great power. Still, to truly accede to great power 
status, Japan needed to expand territorially as the others had. 
8Soon after Western powers began forcing Japan to 
normalize its foreign relations in 1853, Japanese leaders 
sought to expand their fledgling empire. The logical first 
step towards expansion onto the Asian mainland was the 
takeover of the Korean Peninsula. However, Korea had 
traditionally been a Chinese vassal-state, and despite the 
Western powers eroding its influence, the Qing dynasty 
had been able to maintain effective control. In 1876, Japan 
forced the Korean kingdom of Joseon into an unequal 
trade treaty in spite of Chinese objections. 
This expanding Russian sphere 
of influence began to directly 
conflict with Japanese interests. 
Continued Japanese efforts to assert itself into Korean 
politics heightened tensions in Sino-Japanese relations 
Yet after China and Japan signed the peace treaty, the 
terms were forcibly altered by the Tripartite Intervention 
of Russia, Germany, and France, ostensibly to maintain 
the stability of East Asia. Russia was the primary agent 
behind the intervention; it sought both to assert its own 
influence in East Asia and to secure its borders along 
Manchuria against the seemingly powerful China, as 
evidenced by the construction of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway (Malozemoff 1958, 27). Russia particularly 
objected to the Japanese acquisition of the harbor city of 
Port Arthur since it hoped to establish it as its own warm-
water port in the East (Kowner 2006, 375). Japan agreed 
to altered terms of peace in the face of the three great 
powers, whose combined naval capabilities outmatched 
Japan’s.1 The terms imposed by the Tripartite Intervention 
prevented Japan from acquiring the Liaodong Peninsula 
and Port Arthur in exchange for an additional 30 million 
taels of silver to be paid by China. This intervention by 
the Russian diplomatic coalition humiliated Japan and 
created a deep sense of suspicion towards the Russians. 
In turn, Japan began further investing in its machine 
industry and military while also signing an alliance with 
Great Britain to counterbalance Russia (Burton 1990, 
100).
Japanese suspicions were confirmed when Russian forces 
occupied Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula in 
1898. Following the fortification of Port Arthur, Russia 
     1 Kowner’s Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War, 375 records the 
local naval power disparity during the 1895 intervention as being thirty-eight 
allied Russian, French, and German warships with a displacement of 95,000 tons 
compared to thirty-one Japanese warships with a displacement of 57,000 tons.
progressively began encroaching on both China and 
Korea, gaining a number of economic concessions. This 
expanding Russian sphere of influence began to directly 
conflict with Japanese interests. Should Japan not have 
contested Russia’s rising power, the island nation itself 
would have been cut off from expansion onto the Asian 
mainland. As such, Japanese leaders became increasingly 
convinced conflict with Russia was necessary (Zhang 
1998, 53). Similarly, Russia was apt to resist Japan’s 
rising power because reducing efforts to supplant China 
as the hegemon of East Asia was counter to its interests 
and investment in eastern territories. The breaking point 
came when, in spite of their assurances they would not do 
so, Russian forces continued to occupy the Chinese region 
of Manchuria and initiated the construction of railways 
connecting the region to its territory after the suppression 
of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 (Katō 2007, 101).2 
Entering negotiations over these actions, Japan sought 
to establish a status quo whereby Russia acknowledged 
its control of Korea and Japan acknowledged Russian 
control of Manchuria. When this proposal was rebuffed, 
Japan understood that Russian actions indicated an even 
greater desire for eastern territory. Another attempt at 
negotiations to demilitarize the area also failed as the 
lack of trust between the two states and concern over 
the emerging security dilemma thwarted compromise 
(Malozemoff 1958, 246). Thus, Japan would need to check 
Russian expansion by force if it was to expand.
Capabilities and Strategies
On the eve of war in 1904, there was a great disparity in 
potential capabilities between Russia and Japan. The 1904 
total population of Russia was roughly 125,000,000 whereas 
Japan possessed a population of only 67,273,000 (Keltie 
1904, 1022-92; 855-75). This massive population difference 
was equally present in military personnel. Pre-war Russian 
military strength was approximately 1,160,000 men while 
Japanese forces only numbered 218,000 (Sarkees and 
Wayman 2010). Furthermore, the Russian navy possessed 
sixty-four warships while the Japanese navy only totaled 
thirty-four (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). And while Japanese 
military expenditures in 1904 far outstripped Russia’s, US 
$89.5 million to US $66.9 million (Sarkees and Wayman 
2010). Russia exceeded Japan in industrial production. 
     2 The Boxer Rebellion was a reactionary uprising in Chinese society in the face of 
increasing Westernization. Between 1899 and 1901, to expel foreign influence from 
China, Boxer rebels and Chinese imperial forces engaged the Eight-Nation Alliance 
that included Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
and the United States. The conflict resulted in a decisive victory for the colonial 
powers, but marked a general decline in direct intervention in China save for Japan, 
Russia, and the United States. For more information on the Boxer Rebellion, see 
Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion; Esherick, Origins; or Bickers, The Scramble for China. 
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Russia produced 2,766,000 tons of iron and steel annually 
as of 1904 while Japan produced only 60,000 tons (Sarkees 
and Wayman 2010). Overall, the Correlates of War Project 
scored Japan’s 1904 composite national capability as 0.0545 
and Russia’s as 0.1132 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).3 This 
scoring represents that in 1904, Japan possessed 5.45 percent 
of world material capabilities while Russia accounted for 
11.32 percent.
While Japan was certainly outmatched by Russian material 
capabilities, its greatest advantage was geography. At its 
shortest distance from the home island of Kyushu, Japan 
was positioned approximately one hundred miles away from 
the Korean Peninsula (Cooling 1994, 455). In contrast, the 
distance by rail from Moscow to Port Arthur was almost five 
thousand miles (Asakawa 1904, 64). Complicating the issue 
posed by this vast distance was the fact that the Trans-Siberian 
Railway had only one track and was not yet fully completed. 
This created an inherent operational disadvantage which was 
further compounded by the concentration of Russian ground 
forces in Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia. As such, Japan’s 
army was able to face Russian forces with relative parity in 
numbers. Similarly, almost two-thirds of Russian warships 
were located in either the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea. Russia’s 
Pacific Fleet was also divided between the recently acquired 
Port Arthur and the traditional eastern base of Vladivostok. 
Any Russian reinforcements would have to travel by ship 
and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, a voyage of several 
weeks (Koda 2005, 22). Equally devastating to Russian 
field capabilities was the lack of an efficient communication 
network that reached East Asia.
This unstable foundation for 
military operations represented 
a failure in Russia’s grand 
strategy.
Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the 
necessity of focusing on the enemy’s center of gravity (von 
Clausewitz [1832] 2004, 687). This was Japan’s second 
greatest advantage, as Russia had virtually no capability to 
both protect its recent gains in Manchuria and also strike 
mainland Japan. Its forces were limited in tactical mobility 
and had to maintain a responsive posture to Japanese 
movements. Furthermore, since Russia would largely be 
     3 The Correlates of War Project is an academic effort to analyze and study 
the facets of conflict since 1816. Correlates of War datasets incorporate a 
number of variables that factor into national military and industrial capabilities 
using quantitative data. For more information, see correlatesofwar.org.
unable to resupply or communicate with its eastern forces 
by land, any concerted campaigns would require substantial 
planning. Thus, Japanese war planners were able to exercise 
more freedom in the campaigns. What resulted was a 
strategy of denial and targeted operations. First, destroying 
the Russian Pacific Fleet would cripple Russian mobility 
and constrict supply lines (Westwood 1986, 38). Second, 
campaigns undertaken with naval superiority in specific zones 
of operation would give Japanese land forces the tactical edge 
needed to overcome Russian numbers (Westwood 1986, 52). 
In contrast, Russia’s eastward expansion severely hampered 
its logistical capabilities, since it lacked proper lines of 
communication and transportation from the industrial 
heartland. Such expansion almost completely drained 
Russia’s financial reserves, leaving the country dependent on 
borrowing large sums from France and Germany (Hunter 
1993, 146). 
Overall, this unstable foundation for military operations 
represented a failure in Russia’s grand strategy. Conversely, 
Japan’s grand strategy was distinctly more calculated. 
Japan followed the British example and focused on naval 
development, constructing the fourth strongest fleet in the 
world by 1902 (Evans and Peattie 2012, 89). As such, Japan 
was able to effectively transport forces to the Asian mainland 
with greater ease than any other contemporary great power. 
Furthermore, Japanese efforts to gain support from foreign 
powers in the form of loans would eventually account for 
almost 40 percent of its wartime expenditure (Hunter 1993, 
151). 
In contrast, modern observers generally find Russian 
preparations for conflict in the East against Japan surprisingly 
lackluster. These plans were predicated on the notion that 
Japan would never be the instigating power (Jukes 2002, 
18). In fact, Russian Viceroy of the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral 
Alekseev expressed an overwhelming confidence in Russian 
military dominance declaring in 1903 that “our plan of 
operations should be based on the assumption that it is 
impossible for our fleet to be beaten, taking into consideration 
the present relationship of the two fleets, and that a Japanese 
landing is impracticable” (Westwood 1986, 37). Yet such 
a cursory look at Russian strategy in the East neglects the 
realities of being the world’s largest land power. As Nicholas 
Papastratigakis (2011) observed in Russian Imperialism and 
Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-
Japanese War, the Russian military apparatus faced no less 
than three major theaters of operations of which the Pacific 
had been deemed the least precarious. The Baltic Sea and the 
Black Sea, positioned significantly closer to the capital at St. 
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Petersburg and Russia’s industrial heartland, both presented 
theaters with greater numbers of rivals that appeared to pose 
a more significant threat to Russia’s national security. As a 
result, the protection of Russia’s holdings in the East would 
rely primarily on defensive naval positioning to prevent 
landings close to Port Arthur, forcing the Japanese into a 
ground war in which vast territories and superior Russian 
numbers could exhaust the small island nation (Patrikeef 
and Shukman 2007, 56). Indeed, in his book on the Russian 
army prior to and during the war with Japan, Commander 
in Chief Aleksey Nikolaevich Kuropatkin noted that the 
Japanese navy outnumbered Russian naval strength in the 
region, relegating the Far Eastern Fleet to a tool of deterrence 
and his ground forces to defensive operations (Kuropatkin 
1909, 27). Kuropatkin therefore argued that his elastic line 
of defense had allowed troop concentrations to retire when 
pressed and nearby garrisons to flank and attack Japanese 
forces (Kuropatkin 1909, 28).
Resolution and Aftermath
Successive Japanese victories throughout 1904 shocked the 
Russian regime, but Russia was ultimately unwilling to sue 
for peace. This unwillingness to accede to proposed Japanese 
terms for peace was in large part due to the influence of Tsar 
Nicholas II’s concern for prestige, but also because the vast 
majority of Russian land forces remained intact (Westwood 
1986, 157). Regardless, the war progressively evolved into 
a stalemate following the Japanese capture of the Liaodong 
Peninsula. Declining offers for an early armistice, Tsar 
Nicholas II sent the majority of Russia’s Baltic Fleet eastward 
in late 1904 via the Cape of Good Hope. This relief force 
was decisively defeated in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima. In 
the battle, Russia lost eleven battleships, four cruisers, six 
destroyers, and twenty-seven auxiliary ships while Japan 
lost only three torpedo boats (Regan 1992, 178). Again, in 
spite of severe losses, Tsar Nicholas II wanted to escalate the 
conflict, but rising domestic tensions coupled with Russian 
revolutionary gains forced him to enter into negotiations in 
August of 1905 (Connaughton 1992, 342).4 Concurrently, 
Japanese losses on land had been mounting, and leaders 
contacted President Theodore Roosevelt to help mediate a 
peace agreement (Connaughton 1992, 272). In its entirety, 
the Russo-Japanese War lasted from February 8, 1904 to 
September 5, 1905. Over the course of nineteen months, 
roughly 2.5 million men had been mobilized and upwards 
     4 Beginning in January of 1905, massed socio-political protests emerged in much 
of Russia largely due to severe social and economic inequality as well as a growing 
discontent with the Russo-Japanese War. Much of the unrest was suppressed using 
military force as typified by “Bloody Sunday,” but the disruptions caused by the 
revolution were severe. For more information about the 1905 revolution see Salisbury, 
Black Night, White Snow; Ascher, Revolution of 1905; or Surh, 1905 in St. Petersburg.
of two hundred thousand were killed or wounded in action 
(Dumas and Vedel-Peterson 1923, 57-9).
The zero-sum nature of the Treaty 
of Portsmouth would perpetuate 
strained relations between the 
two states. 
Even after agreeing to enter into negotiations to end the 
conflict, Russia and Japan hotly contested the negotiation 
planning in an effort to save some level of prestige (Trani 
1969, 62). Delegates on both sides took stark positional 
approaches centered around territorial changes. Ultimately, 
the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905. It 
stipulated that Russia must recognize Korea as part of Japan’s 
sphere of influence and establish exclusive Japanese control 
over Korea (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905). 
Further, Russia was required to withdraw from Manchuria, 
cede the southern portion of Sakhalin Island, and transfer 
the leasing rights of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula 
to Japan (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905). Yet 
this resolution failed to address the underlying issues of 
conflicting Japanese and Russian interests in the region. 
Russia had been denied access to a significant warm-water 
port and lost control of part of its homeland, the southern 
half of Sakhalin Island, which ultimately curtailed eastward 
expansion. The zero-sum nature of the Treaty of Portsmouth 
would perpetuate strained relations between the two states 
that continued through the decline of the Russian Empire in 
1917 and into the Soviet period. 
Japan’s decisive victory crippled Russian international prestige 
and power projection capability. Additionally, the substantial 
loss of face by the Russian regime contributed to the rise of the 
1905 Russian Revolution and the 1917 October Revolution. 
In crippling Russia, whether intentionally or not, Japan 
had effectively removed its sole rival in East Asia while also 
gaining large portions of territory. Yet victory came at a cost 
of a forty-fold increase in the national debt with an annual 
interest accounting for roughly a quarter of the Japanese 
budget (Oyama and Ogawa 1932, 252). In turn, East Asia’s 
new hegemon began developing a regional system of direct 
political and economic imperialism that would come to be 
known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Theoretical Explanation
Due to the decline of Chinese power, the East Asian region 
lost its hegemony that had guaranteed international stability 
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for centuries. The ensuing power vacuum evolved into a semi-
multipolar system whereby major European states effectively 
divided East Asia among themselves. It should be noted that 
Britain and Russia were distinctly more able to project power 
to the region. However, Britain primarily sought to further 
economic ties while Russia sought actual territorial gains and 
the assertion of its own rule. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the only two states that possessed significant forces 
in the region were Japan and Russia. Despite both actors 
cooperating in the suppression of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion 
and engaging in some trading enterprises, this dyad was 
ultimately unable to establish a status quo suitable to both 
parties.
This inability to compromise on delineating spheres of 
influence was largely due to the overwhelming expansionary 
ambitions of both states. Progressively, Russia attempted to 
fill the power vacuum left by China’s decline through a series 
of territorial expansions and treaties with the ailing Qing 
dynasty. Japan, however, was dissatisfied with the emerging 
Russian supremacy in East Asia (Zhao 1998, 52). Yet when 
accounting for certain variables, both states had relative 
parity in military capabilities. In turn, as Lemke and Werner 
(1996) argued in Power Parity, Commitment to Change, 
and War, conflict was highly likely as both actors possessed 
similar capabilities and competed for the same position in 
the regional hierarchy. As such, Japan engaged in conflict 
with Russia to challenge Russia’s rise to power in East Asia. 
Likewise, Russia was unwilling to yield to Japan’s demands, 
as doing so would hamper the ability to impose a system 
favorable to its own ambitions.
This inability to compromise 
on delineating spheres of 
influence was largely due to the 
overwhelming expansionary 
ambitions of both states.
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War can be attributed 
to the contiguity of competing expansionary ambitions. The 
zero-sum game of territorial acquisition was a driving factor 
in the outbreak of war. For Russia, expansion in the East, 
especially in Manchuria and Korea, offered an unparalleled 
economic opportunity (Katō 2007, 101). Russia had largely 
been contained in the West by European interventions and 
could not allow itself to be closed off in the East as well 
(Geyer 1987, 192). Similarly, Japan lacked the prestige and 
power of the other great powers due to its recent entrance 
onto the world stage and small territorial holdings. As an 
island nation, Japan needed to establish a foothold on the 
Asian mainland. Yet any expansion or military buildup by 
one of these powers inherently required a reciprocal response.
Incomplete information and lack 
of compromise prevented the 
peaceful resolution of conflict, 
making war the rational choice.
The intractability of Russian and Japanese expansionary 
ambitions is evidenced by their inability to negotiate. 
Japanese leaders sought Russian assurances that they would 
not interfere in their de facto control of Korea. Likewise, 
Russian leaders wanted Japanese recognition of their 
exclusive economic control of Manchuria. What doomed 
negotiations was the linkage of Manchuria to Korea. Indeed, 
for either state, Manchuria represented potentially massive 
economic gains as a populous, resource-rich region (Katō 
2007, 101). However, Russia needed to maintain a warm-
water harbor at Port Arthur to effectively reap the benefits of 
controlling Manchuria. For Japan, Port Arthur represented 
a historical grievance against Russia and presented a direct 
threat to its control of Korea. Furthermore, the potential 
loss of trade with a region as large as Manchuria would be 
severely detrimental to the Japanese economy that relied 
heavily on trade. Bargaining over these issues was strained 
by Russia’s severe underestimation of Japanese capabilities 
and overestimation of its own. Indeed, Russian Viceroy of 
the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral Alekseev publicly expressed 
such ideas (Westwood 1986, 37). Most importantly, Tsar 
Nicholas II genuinely believed that Japan would yield in the 
face of Russia’s perceived superiority (Jukes 2002, 18). This 
misconception regarding Japanese intentions was, in part, 
the fault of the Japanese government as it failed to indicate 
its resolve to go to war over the question of Korea (Katō 
2007, 102). As such, incomplete information and lack of 
compromise prevented the peaceful resolution of conflict, 
making war the rational choice.
Conclusion
With the effective subversion of its traditional hegemony 
throughout the nineteenth century, the East Asian region 
quickly devolved into systemic anarchy. Hoping to fill the 
void left by China’s weakness, Russia and Japan sought to 
expand territorial control in the region. The Russian need for 
a warm-water port in the Far East was crucial to establishing a 
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strategic base in the region. Likewise, Japan lacked a foothold 
on the Asian mainland and needed to secure its sphere of 
influence in Korea. Thus, limited options for expansion 
placed both actors in opposition to one another’s interests. 
Japan’s defeat of Russian forces shocked contemporary 
observers and effectively marked its ascension to regional 
hegemony over East Asia. This drastic shift in the balance 
of power would be a major contributing factor to Japanese 
expansion into China and the South Pacific throughout the 
next several decades. As a case study in competing ambitions 
of great powers, the Russo-Japanese War offers an exemplary 
instance of an external security dilemma and regional power 
transition.
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